星期三又雜炒

1) 去吧！國民教育兵團！

小測驗：以下三句說話，是誰說的？

1. 「對市民的公眾服務的逐漸均等化，是和社會的民主性成正比。」
2. 「一個社會的人權狀況是由最弱勢群體所受的待遇好壞來衡量的。」
3. 「對不起，你這個民族不能上網。」
   

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答案：第二句是偉大的共產黨說的，不過第三句也一樣。

2) 英國國防部洩漏了講解如何防止洩漏情報的《保安手冊》

WikiLeaks 刊載了洩漏文件，其中有關偉大祖國的情報工作的章節有些很精警，例如「中共間諜都是拍馬屁專家，亦深明酒肉可以軟化人的道理」，又或者叫人唔好同中國人搞嘢，因住被中共情報人員勒索。原文如下：

Chinese Intelligence Aims

3. Chinese intelligence activity is widespread and has a voracious appetite for all kinds of information; political, military,commercial, scientific and technical. It is on this area that the Chinese place their highest priority and where we assess that the greatest risk lies.

4. The Chinese have realised that it is not productive to simply steal technology and then try to `reverse engineer it'. Through intelligence activity they now attempt to acquire an in-depth understanding of production te chniques and methodologies. There is an obvious economic risk to the UK. Our hard earned processes at very little cost and then reproduce them with cheap labour.

5. It is also, potentially, more serious than the above. In certain key military areas China is at least a generation behind the West. The Chinese may be able to acquire illegally the technology that will enable them to catch up. The real danger is that they will then produce advanced weapons systems which they will sell to unstable regimes. They have a track record of doing so. The consequences for the world's trouble spots and any UK involvement there could be disastrous.

Characteristics of Chinese Intelligence Activity

6. Chinese intelligence activity is very different to the portrayal of `Moscow Rules' in the novels of John Le Carre. The Chinese make no distinction between `information' and `intelligence'. Their appetite for information, particularly in the scientific and technical field, is vast and indiscriminate. They do not `run agents'; they `make friends'. Although there are Chinese `intelligence officers', both civilian and military, these fade into insignificance behind the mass of ordinary students, businessmen and locally employed staff who are working (at least part-time) on the orders of various parts of the state intelligence gathering apparatus.

Cultivation

7. The process of being cultivated as a `friend of China' (ie. an `agent') is subtle and long-term. The Chinese are adept at exploiting a visitor's interest in, and appreciation of, Chinese history and culture. They are expert flatterers and are well aware of the `softening' effect of food and alcohol. Under cover of consultation or lecturing, a visitor may be given favours, advantageous economic conditions or commercial opportunities. In return they will be expected to give information or access to material. Or, at the very least, to speak out on China's behalf (becoming an `agent of influence').

Locally Engaged Staff

8. Most companies operating in China are obliged to employ a number of locally engaged staff supplied by organisations such as the `Provincial Friendship Labour Services Corporation'. It is probable that the Chinese civilian intelligence service will have briefed such staff to copy all papers to which they are able to gain access. Many Chinese students and some businessmen also work to a brief from the Chinese intelligence services.

Technical Attacks

9. The Chinese intelligence services are known to employ telephone and electronic `bugs' in hotels and restaurants. They have also been known to search hotel rooms and to use surveillance techniques against visitors of particular interest.

Compromise

10. The Chinese intelligence services have been known to use blackmail to persuade visitors to work for them. Sexual involvement should be avoided, as should any activity which can possible be construed as illegal. This would include dealing in black market currency or Chinese antiques and artefacts, straying into `forbidden' areas or injudicious use of a camera or video recorder."

新聞連結：Defence secrets advice manual leaked; Telegraph, 5 Oct 2009.